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Transform work oxford09 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK, THE DISAPPEARANCE OF 
"WORKERS", AND THE FUTURE OF   WORKPLACE REGULATION 
St. John’s College, University of Oxford 
26 November 2009  
Introduction 
If you have read my curriculum vitae you will not have seen the publication that 
inspires my remarks this evening.   As I was waiting to go off to Harvard to do my 
master‟s degree, I was offered work revising a publication known as the 
Canadian Encyclopaedic Digest.   In particular I was asked to update  the 
chapter on  “street railways” — what you would likely call “trams”.  Sections of the 
chapter covered  such illuminating topics as “sounding the gong” and “using the 
cowcatcher”.  It was boring, stupid work, but  I had to do It for money.   What  
added  injury to insult,  however, was the fact that no one had  travelled on or 
spoken of, much  less  sued, a  “street railway”  since the original chapter was 
written in the 1920s.    
In preparing  my remarks for this evening, the  thought occured to me  that fifty 
years hence, someone may give a lecture at St. John‟s reminiscing about a 
youthful assignment to update a chapter on “workers” or “labour law” or 
“industrial relations”, terms that in the interval  had ceased to refer to any extant 
subject of academic interest or human endeavour.   
A little excursion into history will set the stage for this  glimpse into a possible  
future without  labour market regulation.  From 1945 or 1950  to, say 1970 or 
1975,  workers in most advanced economies enjoyed  rising wages;  more 
secure  job tenure within the internal labour market of the enterprise;  greater 
protection of their health, safety and dignity; and improved access to social 
benefits, such as pensions and health insurance, whether provided by the state 
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or by their employers.  These improvements didn‟t just fall from the sky.  They 
were  secured through the efforts of unions and of  social democratic  and social 
market  parties,  in the context of  favourable labour market conditions associated 
with an expanding economy and  productivity gains and against the backdrop of 
a general desire to avoid the social conflict of the interwar and wartime  years.    
In the 1970s, however, labour markets conditions  began to change in response 
to  larger developments  in the global political economy.  These changes, in turn, 
came to be reflected in the nature of work and character of workplaces and  in 
the  social, cultural and political significance of “work” and “workers”.  The result, 
I will argue, is that the forms of workplace regulation that seemed to serve us well 
during the earlier period no longer do.     
The transformation of work 
The transformation of work in advanced western economies over the past thirty 
or forty years has been well-documented and widely discussed.  Consequently, I 
will simply tick off a few items on a long  list of  relevant historical developments.  
Of course, these developments  have occurred in different ways and to different 
degrees in different states and sectors of the economy. 
Technology, first.  As we all know, technology  has been changing work.  While 
no doubt it has reduced human drudgery, enhanced productivity and triggered  
some positive changes in society as a whole, it has also had a number of 
consequences  prejudicial to the interests of some workers and  to worker  
solidarity and power in general.  
 It has  intensified  the functional division of labour and its geographical
dispersal, thus attenuating social relations and psychological ties amongst
workers.
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 It has  polarized the workforce, creating a relatively privileged cadre of
highly educated and skilled workers (what Galbraith called the “techno-
structure”) but consigning  many unskilled and semi-skilled workers  to the
margins of the labour market.
 It has transformed the strategies used by management to  control  the
work process and the workforce, with highly skilled workers in effect
moving towards a degree of  self-management, and  unskilled workers
increasingly disciplined by their job routines and monitored by their
computers.
 It has set in motion  continuous and accelerating  change in the content of
virtually all work,  thus assuring  the rapid obsolescence  of  workers‟  job-
specific knowledge and the devaluation of their  human capital.
A closely related development is the dramatic shift in employment from 
manufacturing to the service sector.   During the postwar period, the  
manufacturing sector in many countries had come to be characterized by  strong 
internal labour markets,   tenured employment,   widespread trade union 
membership, decent wages  and generous  job-related benefits, such as 
pensions.  Consequently, as large numbers of  manufacturing jobs were lost, 
especially  from the 1970s onwards,  many of these characteristic features of  
workplace life went into decline as well.  Certainly, they were not generally 
replicated in the service sector, which  has been characterized by  relatively low 
wages and modest benefits, insecure employment and  low levels of union 
membership. 
Flexibilization of the workforce  is often seen by employers as an essential 
strategy for  responding to  rapid  changes  in markets or machines.   Workers — 
they contend — must not regard any job as permanent; they must be willing  and 
able to take on new work assignments within the enterprise as required; they 
must be easy to replace if they cannot  do so; and, if there is no work for them, 
they must accept  redundancy without undue cost or delay.    Furthermore, 
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employers have developed various  arrangements that enable them to  rapidly 
mobilize and demobilize a reserve army of labour. These arrangements include 
the creation of  part-time,  seasonal and  short-term jobs,  and the use of 
temporary agency workers.   And finally,  employers have gained  additional 
flexibility by  outsourcing  work altogether rather assigning it to members of  their 
core work force.   This strategy enables them not only to offload labour costs but 
to shift other business risks from themselves  to subcontractors and suppliers.    
Needless to say, flexibilization has undermined  the operation of internal labour 
markets and helped to ratchet downward wages, benefits, the incidence  of  
tenured employment and levels of unionization.  It has also intensified 
competition for available work amongst workers employed by any given employer 
and between them and other workers who benefit from outsourcing practices.   
  
Demography comes next on my list of transformative changes in the world of 
work.    The gender and race composition of the workplace has changed.  White 
males no longer predominate.  Despite persistent and subtle forms of  
discrimination, and despite the existence of job ghettoes,  most jobs are now 
accessible to women, to  people of various provenances, hues and faiths,  and  
to disabled people.   The age composition of the workforce has also changed:  
young people are likely to be older than they used to be when they start work, if 
they are lucky enough to get it at all; and aging workers  are more likely to be 
healthy towards the end of their careers, and in some countries, are protected 
against mandatory retirement, if  not against the perils of a failing pension 
system.   Diversity, in other words, has become a dominant feature of 
contemporary workplaces.  This is as close to an “unqualified human good” as 
we are likely to get.  However, the result is that members of different 
demographic  groups compete  for  work and wages,  seek  to define job content 
and prerogatives in ways that suit their particular needs, and are quick to blame 
“the other” if things go wrong.     Solidarity is difficult to maintain in these 




And how could I fail to mention globalization?  Globalization  is, of course,  made 
possible by technology.  Thanks to developments in communications and 
transportation, most  work can be done anywhere in the world.  This has, in 
effect, created a new and vastly enlarged global labour market.   At one point, it 
appeared that this might in turn lead to a new international division of labour  in 
which the workers in the global North would retain “good jobs” — those requiring 
education, training, skills and sophistication — while “bad jobs” would be sent 
offshore to workers in the global  South.  However,  things didn‟t quite turn out 
that way at all.    As we now know, it turns out that given a bit of time and 
training, workers in the global South are capable of performing very sophisticated 
work indeed and at much lower rates of pay than their  comrades in the global 
North.    
 
Thus globalization has had profound  consequences.  Employers in the 
advanced economies now have an exit option: they can move both  
manufacturing  and  service work  away from their formerly well-paid,  unionized 
workers to workers in countries where much lower pay prevails and unions are 
blessedly absent.    Not that employers  necessarily need to move abroad or 
even threaten to move:  the  mere knowledge of the possibility makes workers in 
the global North  more willing to  work for less and to stay out of unions.     
 
To sum up,  over the past thirty or forty years,  developments in the nature,  
organization and location of work  have increased the precarity of  employment,  
created conflicts or magnified differences amongst workers  in individual 
workplaces, across economies and around the world, undercut  labour solidarity 
and union strength,  and shifted the balance of power in favour of employers both 







The disappearance of “workers” 
 
 
As a labour lawyer, I‟m well aware of proposals to reverse these developments 
which have been so negative for workers.   Some involve tweaking existing 
legislation to improve its administration, extend  its reach or  reinforce its 
substantive requirements. Some involve  the aggressive use of  new contract- or 
tort-based legal strategies to deter  employers  from the abuse of their workers.      
And some involve the formal constitutionalization of labour rights,  embedding 
them in  international legal regimes such as the WTO  or  using  government 
contracts or largesse as an inducement to persuade employers to commit to 
observing higher labour standards at home and abroad.     
 
Many of these  proposals are laudable on their merits,  but none of them is  likely 
to reverse  the structural  changes I have described in the nature and 
organization of work,  in the  bargaining power of individual workers, and in the 
strength of  unions.    Still less are they likely to prevent the disappearance of 
“workers” as a political and industrial force,  as a social and cultural category and 
as  the concept that organizes our thinking about labour law and policy. 
 
Obviously, I cannot document the extent to which people once defined 
themselves as “workers” or as  members of the “working class”,  but these terms 
certainly sound  anachronistic  these days.   People are much more likely to 
define themselves as consumers rather than producers:  as wearers of Nikes or 
drivers of Smart Cars, as vegans or evangelicals, as Arsenal supporters or 
Oxford graduates.   If they experience  unfairness, whether in the workplace or 
elsewhere, they tend to experience it not as “workers” but as members of a 
disenfranchised group  — understandably as  Asians or gays or sightless  people 
do or perversely, as do  BNP members who imagine themselves to be  victimized  
because of their “indigenous British ethnicity”.    The common experience, the 
solidarity-building experience, of workers  — in mines and sweatshops and dark 
satanic mills— is gone.  Gone too is the culture that reinforced that solidarity: the 
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Durham Miner‟s Gala survives but its power is more Proustian than Fabian or 
Marxian;   Coronation Street has become a parody of itself;   and the  cloth cap 
and council flat, the  scruffy pub and chip shop are no longer reliable predictors 
of  shopfloor militancy and Labour politics.    
 
I pause here to acknowledge that like all ideal-types or stereotypes, the picture I 
have drawn  of workers past and workers present is too simple by far.  And I 
acknowledge as well  that in an absolute  sense,  most working people are better 
off than they used to be, say, sixty years ago.  The point I do press on you, 
however, is that to whatever extent  a robust working class culture, identity  and 
solidarity once existed,  these are now greatly diminished if not gone altogether.   
In that qualitative sense, “workers” have disappeared as a sociological category. 
 
In a quantitative  sense, however,  they are still very much a presence in British 
society, and in North American society too.   If income is any indication of  class 
status,   and if one‟s job is a determinant of income,  workers  ought to be a 
larger, more united and more aggressive presence  than they were thirty or forty 
years ago.   Income inequality during that time has grown markedly; and with it  
inequality in  the lives people lead:  in their morbidity and mortality rates; in their 
educational and occupational opportunities;  in their participation in civic affairs 
and politics; in their receipt of social entitlements and  enjoyment of legal  rights.     
Many villains have been held responsible for  the failure of workers and other 
subaltern  groups to unite in reaction to this growing inequality.  They  range  
from  America‟s  neo-conservatives to Britain‟s New Labour, from fatty foods to  
false consciousness.   But whoever the villains  may be,  it seems clear that they 
have largely succeeded: workers are no longer a force to be reckoned with.  
Their industrial movement is in disarray and their political movement verges on 
disaster.   
 
Nor  do  labour issues often play a  central  role in political debates as they once 
did, for example, in  the UK elections of 1964, 1974 and 1979  and still do 
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occasionally and in distant places,  such as Australia in its  2007 federal election.   
Nor are they likely to any time soon, given the  declining ability of trade unions in 
most countries to “deliver the vote”, their diminishing influence within Labour and 
Social Democratic parties, and the dwindling  public interest in and media 
coverage of labour issues (public service strikes always excepted). 
 
Nor has the virtual disappearance of workers and the working class escaped the 
attention of governments.   To cite but one example, the  governments  of many 
countries, including yours and mine, have “disappeared” their labour ministries, in 
the Latin American sense of the term.   In Canada our  Department of Human 
Resources and Skills Development has taken over the functions of the old 
Labour Department.  In the UK,  functions  once assigned to the Ministry of 
Labour have migrated  to the Ministries of Work and Pensions, Education and 
Employment and Business, Innovation and Skills.  Workers,  then, are no longer 
a constituency with moral  claims, voice and agency,  not even a sinister force to 
be either placated or suppressed. Rather they have become a mere “resource” to 
be “developed” through “education” and “skills” training in order to facilitate 
“innovation” and improve the performance of “business”.   Labour market and 
industrial relations policies have  accordingly  become mere  by-products  of 
fiscal, monetary,  trade, human rights and social welfare policies. 
 
The future of workplace regulation  
   
This is a far cry from what we used to think of as the underlying mission of labour 
policy and labour law —  to make life better for workers.  That mission  took 
different forms.   Sometimes the state intervened to  extend protection to women, 
children and other  workers deemed most at risk;  sometimes it  sought to 
restructure  labour markets to achieve full employment  and to  buffer workers 
against the  worst consequences of unemployment;  and sometimes  it  passively 
allowed or actively assisted  workers to aggregate and exercise  collective or 
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countervailing power.    But under the new  dispensation,  none of those 
approaches seems to hold much attraction or promise much success.   
 
Not protecting the most vulnerable workers:   A couple of years ago,  I chaired a 
commission on labour standards legislation for our federal government.    My 
report  was the product of two years of hard work, extensive consultation,  
sophisticated research, and  the expenditure of  $5 mil.  It  sank like a stone, 
ignored by the government and unnoticed by the media.  Almost unnoticed, that 
is.  It did  attract one editorial.   I quote it pretty much verbatim: “Prof. Arthurs has 
recommended the establishment of a national minimum wage.  This is the same 
sort of fuzzy thinking that leads people to oppose child labour.”   This position 
was a little extreme:  many governments have outlawed child labour, established 
minimum wages and taken steps to introduce  a floor of labour standards below 
which no worker is to be allowed to fall.    But still, labour standards in many 
countries remain quite low, are seldom updated to take account of changes in the 
economy, and are  seldom enforced with regularity or vigour.     
 
Not restructuring the labour market to ensure full employment:  globalization has  
forced states to foreswear  many of the strategies they once used  to control  
labour markets; monetarist policies have put  employment policy in the hands of 
finance ministers and central bankers; and neo-liberalism has so captured the 
imagination of most governments that the very idea of “regulating” a market is 
anathema. 
 
And certainly not collective bargaining:   The failure so far by the the U.S. 
Congress to pass  the so-called Employee Freedom of Choice Act  illustrates my  
point.   It represents  a very modest effort to resuscitate collective bargaining in 
America,  and if enacted, it would be the first such statute to do so  since  the 
original National Labour Relations Act of 1935.   Nonetheless, in the current 
economic crisis,  its proponents seem resigned to see it scaled down, delayed or  




The fact is that especially in the current economic crisis even presumptively  
labour-friendly governments are nervous  about adopting labour legislation for  
fear of provoking business opposition,  capital flight and the loss of tax revenues 
and jobs.   A  graffito I once saw in Swiss Cottage says it all:  “The  economy is 
the secret policy of our desires.”  And like the East German Stasi, the economy is  
everywhere, not just  spying on us, not just threatening us, but invading our 
thoughts, conditioning our actions, transforming our values.  Our concern to keep 
the  economy sound  has overwhelmed  the moral repulsion we once felt against 
the exploitation of workers,  the need we once felt to proffer social justice as an 
antidote to  left wing extremism  and union militancy,  the pride we once felt as 
ordinary working men and women stepped forward to participate in the affairs of 
the nation.   The economy is able to police our desires, I want to say,  because 
“workers” and their movement are no longer there to resist.     Or to put it another 
way, the future of labour market regulation depends not so much on the 
reinvention of  regulatory  machinery as on the recovery of social and political 
forces that are willing  to articulate workers‟ interests and able to defend  
workers‟ rights.   
 
That said,  the machinery of labour market regulation is indeed in need of 
reinvention.  Much  labour law and policy was originally designed to protect  
“employees” who were presumed to be  male,  and employed  full-time by a 
single employer over an extended period.  Of course, as workplace demography 
has changed, we have made some adjustments:  women  have been 
accommodated by outlawing gender discrimination and providing a patchwork 
system of benefits and  leaves to ensure social reproduction;  part-time workers  
are sometimes provided a pro rata share  of  the entitlements  of full-time 
workers;  and occasionally  ways are found to  permit  workers to retain certain 
benefits as they move from one job to another.   But the fact remains that laws 
and policies based on the paradigm of the  full-time, long-term male worker no 




  As labour laws  and policies are adjusted to  accommodate non-
paradigmatic workers,  their administration  becomes more and more 
complicated for both employers and governments.   Moreover,  non-
paradigmatic workers often have unique  needs and are sometimes ill-
served by being assimilated to the statutory norm.   And finally, these 
adjustments and accommodations  are often perceived (however wrongly) 
as part of a zero sum game, in which  resources are taken from “ordinary” 
workers and redistributed to those with “special needs”.    
 
 In North America, and to some extent elsewhere,  collective bargaining  
tends to be organized at the workplace level;  but as  workers  move from 
job to job more frequently, they are less likely to be in any one job long 
enough to bond with their fellow workers and form a union;  workplace 
diversity, moreover,  makes the task of bonding more difficult, and 
complicates the brokerage functions the union must perform in order to 
maintain the support  of different groups in the workplace.    
  
 Important job benefits, such as training, insurance and pensions, have 
traditionally been provided by employers with a view to  recruiting and 
retaining the workers they need.  In addition, governments have chosen 
the employment nexus as the platform from which to deliver certain 
programs.   However,  as employers come to place a higher premium on 
the flexibility of their workforce, as the incidence  of non-standard 
employment rises,  as job tenure shortens and employment  becomes 
more intermittent, as more and more workers become self-employed  or 
fall outside the statutory parameters  of “employment”,  access to these 
employer- and state-provided benefits is made more difficult to maintain 
or denied altogether.   In the absence of unions to provide or press for 




Other aspects of the transformation of work have likewise  rendered obsolete 
much of the established machinery of  labour market regulation.  Again,  I offer  
just a few  examples:   
 
 The shift from  manufacturing to  service jobs has revealed that laws 
premised on one sort of employment relationship do not necessarily 
produce the desired results when transplanted onto another.   Should 
labour legislation be drafted to take account of  sectoral differences?  Or 
will this produce boundary disputes, undue  complications in 
administration,  complaints concerning unequal treatment and a return to  
corporatism?   
 
 Globalization, as mentioned, allows employers to shift work abroad, which 
undercuts the ability of unions to protect their members‟ interests, and the 
willingness of workers to seek better working conditions.  To counter the 
advantages that have accrued to employers,  unions have attempted  to 
develop transnational strategies.  These include imposing restraints on 
the  movement of work abroad, organizing foreign  workers to demand 
decent working conditions, and enlisting the help of social movements to 
boycott goods produced under exploitative conditions.   However, this 
transnational union activity is sometimes  difficult  to square with  the law 
of both  home and host countries;  awkward to implement in countries 
with different types of labour markets and industrial relations systems; 
and  risks being resented  by its intended beneficiaries as an intrusion on 
their autonomy and culture, or as  a pre-emptive move in the  global 
competition for   limited work opportunities. 
 
 Technology has not only transformed  the way work is performed; it has 
introduced many  new items onto  the regulatory agenda.   For example,  
given  the need of workers to constantly renew their skills, who should 
bear the cost of their doing so: the state?  the employer? or the  worker?    
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Technology enables employers to  respond to  their customers „round the 
clock, and globalization requires that they  do so.   But  for employers to 
respond, employees must be available on at least a standby basis.    
Should laws fixing maximum hours of work and requiring premium pay for 
overtime be changed to accommodate the employer‟s business needs, or 
the employee‟s needs for even greater protection against intrusion on his 
or her free time?  Technology enables employers to maintain closer 
surveillance and tighter discipline over the work force.    Should the law 
protect the right of  workers to privacy and to the small acts of  sabotage 
and subversion that privacy permits;  or do they abandon that right  when 




So: I have reached some  rather  bleak conclusions.  The transformation of  work 
and workplaces is  both a cause and an effect of  the disappearance of “workers” 
as a  political and industrial movement, as a  recognizable social and cultural 
phenomenon,  and as a distinct subject of public policy,  law making and 
administration.   But if “workers” are no more, the same cannot be said of      
inequality, injustice and the socially irresponsible use of power.  All of these 
continue to thrive in our workplaces, in our communities, in our public policies.    
The challenge,  then, is  how to confront these wrongs now that we can no longer 
locate them within a familiar category of contention?    Essentially, we face three  
broad choices.   
 
One choice is to move on, to  accept that “work” or “labour” is no longer available  
as  a category of social analysis, no longer viable as a site of  social mobilization.  
If we do accept that option,  if we do move on,  our most obvious strategy is to 
adopt the perspective of human rights.  Usually framed as a series of broad 
principles of  universal application — freedom, dignity, equality — these 
principles ought to apply to people  at work, no less than people at other 
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moments in their lives.   Indeed, by recasting workers‟ concerns as everyone‟s 
concerns, it is possible to imagine that a new, broader and stronger coalition will 
emerge to support them than the  coalition that once assembled in the serried 
ranks  of the working class.   
 
A second, less obvious, choice is to  explore  what has been and can be 
accomplished  within the prevailing assumptions of  global, neo-liberal capitalism.    
If we acknowledge that for all its negative effects,  capitalism  has also improved 
the quality of life of millions of people, it may be possible to build on that success.    
A century ago,  in the last age of robber barons,  Henry Ford paid his workers 
well so that they could buy his cars.  In the last great depression of the 1930s, 
even advocates of  laissez faire came to support Keynesian strategies  as a form 
of “market correction” that would restore the confidence and purchasing power of 
consumers.  During  the technology boom of the 1990s,  even notoriously self-
aggrandizing  employers realized that  high performance work systems that  
“empowered”  workers, invested in their welfare and  rewarded their efforts  
generously,  would increase  their performance and productivity and, ultimately, 
corporate  profits.  And finally, recent proposals to “ratchet labour standards” 
upward seek  to institutionalize  this pragmatic approach that justifies  the decent  
treatment of workers  as a contribution to profitable  business outcomes.  
 
The final  choice is, of course,  to attempt to  resuscitate or reinvent  the labour 
movement.    Some people claim to have identified “green shoots” in successful 
organizing campaigns amongst low-paid service workers in America;  others 
advocate a new form of “civic unionism” in which workers and social movements 
would unite around the achievement of goals such as a “living wage” or “work-life 
balance” for everyone; and still others note that particular groups of privileged 
workers — professionals, skilled technicians, athletes, academics — have 
invented new strategies and institutions of collective action that are appropriate 




The success of this last approach — of resuscitated unionism or reinvented  
social democracy  — depends heavily on the extent to which the current crisis of 
capitalism arouses people‟s conscience and transforms their  consciousness.  
Perhaps  it will make them more aware of the precariousness  of their situation, 
of the falsity of the doctrine of “individual responsibility” and of the fallibility of the  
“invisible hands”  that now steer the economy;  perhaps too it will remind them  of 
the past achievements of collective worker action and of the state in its role as 
the guarantor of social justice.  If so,  it may not be too late to refurbish the old 
approaches to labour market regulation.     
 
On the other hand, perhaps  the current crisis will resolve itself, or leave us 
fearful and exhausted with no appetite for  fundamental reform.  And  perhaps 
the old approaches to labour market regulation are so decrepit and discredited, 
or so unsuited to  the new world of work,  that they cannot  be revived.    In any of 
these scenarios  we are left with a much larger and more difficult task:  not just 
the resuscitation of old approaches but the total re-conceptualization  of work, 
workers and workplace regulation.     
 
I do take heart from the most recent history  of street railways.    After suffering 
almost total extinction in North America  between the wars, as new technologies 
replaced them and new forms of social organization rendered them obsolete,  
they have reappeared under a new name and in redesigned format.   Now called 
“light rapid transit” (or LRTs) they are now widely regarded  as an indispensable  
feature  of  modern urban planning  and as the very epitome  of ecological 
responsibility.    Perhaps labour standards,  collective bargaining and the other 
discarded  20th century technologies of labour market regulation will likewise 
reappear in the 21st century, fully re-engineered, renamed and ready to serve as 
the vehicle of a revived workers‟ movement and the embodiment of a renewed 
vision of social justice in the workplace. 
 
